





FS I 96 - 317
Problems on the Road to „High Skill“:
A sectoral lesson from the transfer


















Problems on the Road to „High Skill“:
A sectoral lesson from the transfer
of the dual system of vocational training
ito eastern Germany
Discussion Paper FS I 96 - 317
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung 1996
Forschungsschwerpunkt: Research Area:
Arbeitsmarkt und Labour Market and
Beschäftigung Employment
Abteilung: Research Unit:
Wirtschaftswandel und Economic Change and
Beschäftigung Employment
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
Reichpietschufer 50
D-10785 BerlinPepper D. Culpepper
* Harvard University
and
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung
Earlier incarnations of this paper were presented at a seminar of the Department of Economic Change
and Employment at the WZB and at the conference on “The Distributive Dimensions of Political
Economy” at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University.  I benefited from the comments of
participants in both, and especially those of Steve Casper, Peter Hall, Robert Putnam, Marino Regini,
Charles Sabel, and David Soskice.  Financial support for this project from the Center for European
Studies at Harvard and from the WZB is gratefully acknowledged.Abstract
The central challenge of transferring the dual system of education and training to
eastern Germany is to convince companies to bear the in-firm costs of
apprenticeship training. Two prominent explanatory variables in the social scientific
literature - national institutions and social capital - offer certain predictions about
which factors will be most important in facilitating the transfer of the dual system to
eastern Germany. Data from interviews with thirty-four firms in the metal and
electronics industry suggest that institutionalist theory mis-specifies the role of
employers in "coordinated market economies." Employers' associations in both
eastern and western Germany have neither the access to inside information nor the
informal sanctioning capacity attributed to them in this literature, nor do they play any
role in the regular diffusion of strategies of "best practice". Ownership by western
German companies, however, appears to be of particular significance in the decision
of eastern German companies to train, a link which may support the institutional
emphasis on access to long-term finance. Social capital is unable to explain
significant variance in the ability of companies to cooperate in order to create
additional apprenticeship places. The role of policy design in the new federal states
appears to have an important effect in explaining the ability of firms in some states to
cooperate in training apprentices. The ability to craft effective policies depends on
coordination among state governments and employers' organizations, but the
distributive conflicts inherent in these subsidies can hamper cooperation among
employers.
Zusammenfassung
Die zentrale Herausforderung bei der Übertragung des dualen
Berufsausbildungssystems nach Ostdeutschland ist es, die Unternehmen davon zu
überzeugen, die internen Kosten der Ausbildung zu tragen. Besonders zwei
Variablen in der sozialwissenschaftlichen Literatur - das nationale
Institutionengefüge und das Sozialkapital - weisen auf vorab benennbare Faktoren
hin, die wichtig sind, um den Transfer des dualen Systems nach Ostdeutschland zu
erleichtern.
Informationen und Daten aus Interviews in 34 Unternehmen der Metall- und
Elektronikindustrie führen zu der Annahme, daß die Institutionen-Theorie die Rolle
von Unternehmern in „koordinierten Marktwirtschaften“ mißinterpretiert.
Unternehmensverbände in Ost- und Westdeutschland haben weder Zugang zuInsider-Informationen noch eine wie auch immer geartete Sanktionsmöglichkeit - wie
ihnen in der Literatur zugeschrieben wird -, und sie spielen auch keine Rolle in der
üblichen  Verbreitung von „best-practice“-Erfahrungen. Wenn ein Unternehmen in
Ostdeutschland einem westdeutschen Unternehmen gehört, so scheint dies
allerdings eine wichtige Rolle bei der Entscheidung für eine berufliche
Erstausbildung in dem ostdeutschen Unternehmen zu spielen. Dies könnte in einem
Zusammenhang mit der Diskussion um die Bedeutung von Institutionen und dabei
um den Zugang zu langfristigem Kapital gesehen werden.
Die These vom „Sozialen Kapital“ kann die erheblichen Unterschiede in der Fähigkeit
der Unternehmen, durch Kooperation zusätzliche Ausbildungsplätze zu schaffen,
nicht erklären. Die je spezifische Art, wie politische Prozesse in den neuen
Bundesländern gestaltet werden, scheint dagegen ein wichtiger Indikator zu sein, um
die in einigen Bundesländern vorhandene Kooperationsfähigkeit von Unternehmen
bei der Lehrlingsausbildung zu erklären.
Die Fähigkeit, wirksame politische Lösungen zu entwickeln, hängt von der Art der
Zusammenarbeit zwischen Länderregierungen und Unternehmensverbänden ab,
doch können Verteilungskonflikte, die immanent zu Subventionen gehören, die
Kooperation zwischen Unternehmern behindern.Table of Contents
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1. Introduction
By incorporating the states of the former GDR into the West German "dual
system"
1 of vocational education and training, the German government did
many of its admirers around the world a great favor and gave social scientists a
good natural experiment.  In 1990 the German system of training was at its
zenith of popularity among political economists and politicians, seen as the
blueprint for industrial economies trying to create a system in which a broad
base of high-skilled workers enables the maintenance of a high-wage export
sector which can continually innovate its way into niche markets of international
economy.  The favor to admirers was the natural experiment:  now those
admirers who had been scratching their heads in bemusement, wondering  how
to set up such a system at home, could take notes while the West Germans
tried to set up those institutions in the new federal states of the former German
Democratic Republic.  This paper reports some results gathered in the course
of observing that natural experiment.
The defining feature of the dual system is the role of firms in financing the
training of apprentices: it is a feature which adds much collective action
piquancy to the question of training reform.  Both firms and potential
apprentices have to invest in the training relationship.  The former invests
money in an apprentice's skills, the latter invests time in developing those skills,
while being paid a relatively low wage.  Investments create sunk costs, and
sunk costs create opportunities for exploitation by the partners to an exchange.
An apprentice may fear exploitation in a training scheme which in reality
provides a firm with cheap labor without increasing the individual's productivity.
A firm fears bearing the costs of training an apprentice, only to lose the
apprentice to another firm, which "poaches" the skilled worker without having
had to invest in the development of these skills (Finegold 1992).  If all the
actors in this game can be persuaded to cooperate without defecting, then the
way is open for the establishment of a “high-skill equilibrium,” a situation in
which the majority of firms in broad sectoral swathes of the economy invest
substantially in the training of their workers, while the apprentices themselves
have acquired the requisite general qualifications and are willing to accept
apprenticeship wages in return for the development of skills that will yield them
a significantly higher return over the life cycle.  This is the situation that was
said to characterize (especially the export-oriented sectors of) the German
economy during the 1980s (Finegold and Soskice 1988).  For eastern
                                                          
1 The duality in the German dual system refers to the division of apprentices' time between a
vocational school (Berufsschule), which they attend one or two days per week and a firm where
they have an apprenticeship contract.2
Germany, the benefits of the high-skill equilibrium are obvious.  What is not so
obvious is how to establish a new training system such that the participants
believe they will get to the win-win situation of the high-skill equilibrium without
being duped.
So the stylized central problem of my dissertation is a collective action
problem:  how to move a political economy to a “high-skill equilibrium.”  In
reality, of course, the dependent variable—the degree of success or failure of a
radical reform of the training system—is multi-dimensional.  I have taken as
central to the success of reform of the system in eastern Germany the key
characteristic of the dual system in the former West Germany:  that firms
themselves are willing to bear the cost of training
2.  Getting firms to train is a
central objective of German policy in eastern Germany, and must be
considered the single most important indicator of success.
But it is not the only one.  One must also look at how the two parties to the
training contract—managers (firms) and apprentices—view the central
institutions of the dual system:  the supervision provided by the chambers of
industry and commerce, the functioning of the mediation (Vermittlung) of the
Employment Offices, and the quality of the schools which provide instruction
complementary to the in-firm training.  Moreover, the quality of the skills
imparted has to be satisfactory, both to the firms, who are the consumers of the
skills, and to the young people themselves, who invest in the skills and want to
have a good return on that investment over the life cycle.
Determining and passing judgment on the success or failure of the dual
system in eastern Germany since 1990 is a book length project.  My more
restricted goal in this paper is to bring evidence from thirty-four firms in the
German metal and electronics industry to bear on the question of how training
reform in Germany has proceeded since 1990.   Both whether, and how much,
firms are training—as well as the perspective of the firms on the quality of the
supervisory role of the employers' association and the chambers of industry
and commerce (Industrie- und Handelskammer, or IHKs)—will be covered in
this paper.  I will also test five intermediate hypotheses with the goal of
shedding some light on the relative importance of social capital and national
institutions in explaining some of these outcomes.
                                                          
2 Cf. Osterman (1994) for a discussion of the problems of accounting for the real costs of firm training.3
2. Theories and Hypotheses
2.1. Institutions
An important branch of the institutionalist research dealing with comparative
political economy in the 1980s posited that the literature on neo-corporatism
had focused too narrowly on wage bargaining institutions, as wage bargaining
is only one of a set of institutions whose interaction affects national economic
policy and outcomes (Zysman 1983, Scharpf 1984, Katzenstein 1985, Hall
1986).  As well, the debates on corporatism and on macro-economic outcomes
ignored the increasing importance of new firm strategies on the complexion of
the national political economy (Piore and Sabel 1984) and, relatedly, neglected
the importance of the preferences of business in constructing and maintaining
systems for regulating the political economy (cf. Swenson 1989).
Building on this research, David Soskice has argued that different
constellations of institutions constitute discrete “varieties of capitalism” (Soskice
1990a and 1990b; cf. Albert 1993).  Certain constellations of the organization of
business, the organization of labor, and the structure of the financial system
provide a cooperative framework for competing social groups, resulting in
"coordinated market economies;" other constellations which do not provide
institutional forums for group negotiation yield "liberal market " (uncoordinated)
economies.  Each type of political economy has a comparative institutional
advantage for some sorts of firm strategies, but it is clear that for solving
problems of cooperation, like education and training reform, the institutions of
the coordinated economy should be more conducive to success.  It is only in
the coordinated economies that the elements of the high-skill equilibrium are
present (Soskice 1990a).
Among the prerequisites of a coordinated economy are strong and
cohesive employers' associations and labor organizations, each of which
should be able to make credible commitments on the behalf of its constituents,
along with a financial system in which firms have easy access to long-term
finance (that is, capital provided by the state or large banks, which limits the
prevalence of corporate takeovers).  Primus inter pares of the institutions of
Soskice's causal model is the organization of business
3.  The employers’
                                                          
3 Labor organizations serve a stabilizing function in Soskice’s work:  unions and works councils
guarantee that the training system will not be transformed into a low-wage scam for exploiting
the young, as unions must approve all revisions to the structure of job qualifications in
negotiations with employers’ representatives; the legal prerogatives of the works councils give
apprentices a recourse in the case of perceived abuse; and the expertise of works councils in
the technical aspects of training strengthens the hand of the union in negotiating revisions to the
training regulations (cf. Streeck 1987).  Moreover, an individual firm which wishes to use wage
premiums to poach newly trained apprentices from other firms must negotiate these4
association provides firms with a mechanism for coordinating their views and
negotiating with the unions to update the skill requirements of professions,
while continually diffusing “best practice” training strategies to firms (Soskice
1994).  To fulfill this coordinating role, the business organization must have
access to "inside information of firms," in order to factor this information into
discussion over bargaining positions; it must be capable of diffusing best
practices in areas like vocational training;  and it must have a sanctioning
capacity against firms which do not adhere to strategic positions (Soskice
1990b: 42-43; Hancké and Soskice 1994: 26).
Together, the institutions of the coordinated economy provide forums for
negotiation among competing groups, systems of monitoring, and a sanctioning
ability in the case of non-compliance.  In the specific case of education and
training reform, each of the three institutions of Soskice's model buttresses the
others to facilitate the introduction of a new system of skill provision.  By
working with the labor union to establish and certify the skill content of training
courses, the business organization eases labor's fears of an exploitative
training system.  By giving a firm access to patient holders of capital, who will
bear the “uncovered” risk of costly training programs, the institutional
arrangement facilitates a long-term perspective on the firm's investment in
skilled labor.  Finally, the organization of business gives firms a channel
through which to punish other firms that systematically poach trained workers.
These institutions solve the cooperative dilemmas of training reform not by
relying on trust, but by providing firms with sources of technical expertise and
advice while constituting a system in which mutual expectations among actors
are clear and non-cooperative behavior can be discovered and punished.
The coordinated economy model is in its element when explaining stasis:
why cooperative behavior can be maintained thanks to the mutually reinforcing
institutions enumerated above.  Since November 1989, though, eastern
Germany has certainly not been in stasis.  Equilibrium analysis is by definition
ill-suited to explain change, although it points up many of the reasons why
change is so difficult.  So, in testing the utility of this model for explaining
success or failure in the transfer of the institutions of the coordinated economy
to eastern Germany, the static character of the model must be borne in mind.
For a situation of radical change, the most appropriate analogy for the
institutional mechanisms of change may not be that of equilibrium analysis
(since in equilibrium, nothing ever happens), but may instead be that of nuclear
fission.  In order for the institutions of the coordinated economy to begin
functioning with one another, thus producing predictable patterns of behavior
                                                                                                                                                                         
adjustments with the works council; and the works council is unlikely to allow the firm to pursue
a strategy of poaching skilled workers trained elsewhere (Soskice 1994).
Thus, the stabilizing role of labor organizations in Soskice’s equilibrium explanations
cannot be ignored.  However, this paper focuses only on employers’ because of their
preeminence in Soskice’s work.5
among the key actors of the economy, we first need to get a critical mass of
interacting agents; the agents in this case being the financial and organizational
infrastructure, along with the management of firms.  Only once the number of
agents interacting with each other in predictable ways reaches a certain
amplitude can we reasonably expect the interactions to be self-sustaining.
For the eastern German political economy to reach critical mass, then, the
institutional theory of the coordinated economy would predict, above all, the
assumption by the employers’ organizations of certain roles in the area of
education and training.  Left unsaid here, but very much in the background, is
that managers and firms are more likely (if the model is valid) to interact in the
predicted way with the employers’ organizations if they have the access to long-
term finance and they face a union movement strong enough to play the
coordinating role on the labor side.  Restricting our attention for this paper to
the employers’ side, though, the following three hypotheses should be true if
the model of the coordination is to explain outcomes in eastern Germany:
HI1:  The employer's association and/or the IHKs provide firms with advice and
guidelines for training, including the diffusion of best practice in different sorts of
jobs.
One great advantage of the coordinated economy in the realm of training is
its infrastructural support to the firms which train.  While both the Chambers
and the employers’ association are seen to play a role in this system of
information provision, it is the employers’ association which Soskice clearly
designates as the primary supplier of detailed information to firms, especially
larger firms:
The close relationship between companies and employer associations, in vocational
training, has significant consequences for the research, development, and diffusion of
new training practices, and for the process of defining new and augmenting existing
apprenticeships. It means that employer associations have expertise in working out
training solutions for companies in many different situations, and it provides a good
way of diffusing best practice (Soskice 1994: 34).
HI2:  In order to fulfill this role, employer's associations and/or IHKs have
access to inside (potentially sensitive) information of firms; firms are willing to
provide the association with this access.
Here the division of labor between the Chambers and the employers’
association is fairly clearly cut.  “The main roles of the employer associations
are in developing new apprenticeships and modifying existing ones, as well as
advising larger companies; the chambers are responsible for organizing the
local apprenticeship system, approving and monitoring company training, and
running the examination system” (Soskice 1994: 28).  The Chambers need
access to information to maintain the minimum standards of the system, while
the employers’ association needs access to detailed technical information to6
help the larger firms keep their training policies on the cutting edge.  And when
it comes to sensitive information, “companies are often loath to be monitored
by, or give detailed information to, government, because they distrust the use to
which the information will be put. Employers’ organisations are in a better
position to engage the co-operation of companies, because they are seen to be
on the side of companies as a whole” (Finegold and Soskice 1988: 47-48).
HI3:  The employer's association possesses a sanctioning mechanism to
identify and punish firms which poach the trained workers of other firms rather
than (or in addition to) training their own apprentices.
This is the first lesson in Collective Action 101:  the best way to keep
individuals or firms from free riding is to be able to identify and punish free-
riding.  And, in a situation (as in the new federal states of eastern Germany) of
trying to set-up the institutions of the “high-skill equilibrium,” we can expect the
problem of poaching of skilled workers to be particularly acute
4.  With many
companies facing enormous problems of competitiveness in the wake of
monetary union with western Germany, poaching the skilled workers of other
firms might allow those firms to economize on the costs of training while
allowing them to upgrade the productivity of their workforce.   In the idealized
description of how the high skill equilibrium works in Germany, Soskice (1994:
34) comments that “employer associations, including chambers, have
significant informal sanctioning ability over companies.”  Thus, in order for the
high-skill equilibrium to be firmly set-up in the unfamiliar terrain of eastern
Germany, the employers’ association must have “resources (particularly in
relation to training)…large enough to give them some power in relation to large
companies” (Soskice 1990b: 60).
2.2. Social Capital
Soskice's conditions for successful coordination—deliberation, monitoring, and
enforcement—are the conditions for exchange between atomized individuals
(cf. Granovetter 1985).  The institutions of the coordinated economy must be
able to fulfill all these functions because the links between the individual actors
                                                          
4 The problem of transition to the high-skill equilibrium is so difficult precisely  because some of
the self-reinforcing features of the equilibrium are not yet in place.  Thus, in the case of poaching
skilled workers, firms in western Germany could be particularly worried about the adverse
selection situation known as the “lemon problem”; that is, when most large training firms retain
their own best skilled workers (having invested quite a bit in their training), those skilled
apprentices who are on the labor market may have problems which were detected by the firms
which trained them, who therefore did not want to hire them (Soskice 1994 contains a subtle
discussion of this problem).  By way of contrast, since eastern Germany is only now in the
process of taking over these features of the high skill equilibrium, potential poachers do not see
this problem posed as dramatically as in the west.7
are so tenuous that, without the guarantees that an institution provides,
coordination could not take place among them.  Coordination through a
network, by contrast, would depend on the nature of the links that connect
members to one another.  These links can obviate some of the Prisoner's
Dilemmas involved in cooperative situations, but they do so without the ironclad
guarantee provided by institutional forms of monitoring and enforcement.
Indeed, network ties create great opportunities for exploitation by virtue of their
lack of formal monitoring and enforcement capacities:  "The trust engendered
by personal relations presents, by its very existence, enhanced opportunity for
malfeasance" (Granovetter 1985: 491).
James Coleman used the concept of social capital to denote a resource
constituted by the links among individuals in a society; members of that society
can draw on this “social capital” to circumvent potential collective action
problems and thereby increase their joint productivity (Coleman 1988 and 1990;
Putnam 1993).  In an extension of this sort of logic to the problem of explaining
successful governmental performance, Putnam specifies two components to
social capital:  dense networks of civic engagement and norms of reciprocity
(1993: 167-176).  In this iteration of my project, I will try to investigate the
empirical evidence which links network ties to the macro-indicators of "social
capital" used by Putnam:  survey data on trust, and the density of club
networks.  Before attempting to derive testable hypotheses of the effects of
social capital on training reform, I discuss why I think network cooperation might
differ from the formal associational ties characteristic of the coordinated
economy model.
Unlike formal organizations, which facilitate cooperation among members
on specified issues, network links are as conducive to decentralized, sponta-
neous cooperation over new issue areas as they are to collective action on
issues regularly confronted by the group.  These links comprise a combination
of rational calculation with something else:  that something else may be, for
example,  habituation, or a predominant cognitive template, or normative
pressure.  Something about network linkages not only makes it rational to
cooperate, but also influences the way individuals think about the cooperative
process.  Whereas institutions concretize the relations among individuals,
giving them an organizational resource upon which to draw to solve problems,
networks provide the software of cooperative capacity without the hardware of
formal organizations
5 (that is, without the legal codification of the rights and
responsibilities of associations with relation to each other, nor with the formal
bureaucracy associated with large-scale employers' associations or unions)
6.
                                                          
5 I borrow the software/hardware analogy from Claus Offe, who has used it somewhat differently
in his own work on reform in eastern Germany.
6 Critics will note, rightly, that bowling clubs are also formal organizations.  This is true, but
associations are a measure of social capital, not its substance.  It is assumed that places with a high
density of bowling clubs are also those places with plenty of cooperative capacity and social trust.8
The least credulous readers may well pose the following question:  why on
earth should the number of clubs in an area have anything to do with the
resolution of the problems of transition to the dual system of training in the
context of a market economy in eastern Germany?  There are two elements
behind this question which I will address sequentially.  First, there is the
potential objection of those who may be convinced of the general explanatory
power of social capital for problems of effective government and of collective
action, but who cannot see the relevance for the strictly economic decisions
related to training.  Social capital may explain government effectiveness in Italy,
they say, but there is no reason to expect such a general “social” phenomenon
to enter into the individual calculus of firms and managers in making decisions
about training.  Agreed; social capital would have to be pretty pervasive stuff if it
filtered down even to this specific level.  If it were to be at work even at this
level, though, we would expect firms in high social capital areas to be more
willing to train—and enter the stylized collective action problem sketched
above—than firms in low social capital areas.
However the promise of social capital in this realm, which is also the
reason it is entirely legitimate to test it in such an area, is that the aggregate
training behavior of firms in a region becomes a collective problem, which is
addressed by collective actors.  The Chambers of Commerce, for instance, are
para-public bodies to which every industrial firm in a region must belong.  Just
as Putnam tested the effectiveness of regional governments in providing
solutions to specific problems which do not directly affect every single member
of a community—like child-care—we can fairly expect the collective institutions
like the Chambers to do a better job in regions of high social capital.  At this
general problem solving level, the prediction of social capital advocates must be
that the para-public institutions work better.
This brings us to the second group of objectors to the validity of testing
social capital as a solution to problems of training reform.  This group is largely
unconvinced of the merits of any argument based on a generalized social
capital and wonders why we waste any more time thinking about it.  It is difficult
to convince this group of the merits of testing the hypotheses derived from the
social capital literature, because they have already made up their minds
anyway.  That is too bad, because the findings of Putnam (1993, 1995a and b)
and others on the so-called “social virtues” of cooperativeness have generated
a debate in the wider public discourse matched by no other single literature in
American political science in the last five years.  Such a concept can only make
the transition out of the confines of the ivory tower into public debate when it is
persuasively argued and empirically demonstrated, and when it resonates with
the common sense of non-expert observers.  Generating such a public debate
can only be salutary, but the role of political scientists in this debate is to push
these findings to their limits, trying to confirm of call into question the original
findings while testing its limits of applicability.  It is in this empirical spirit that
this paper proceeds.9
In applying this approach to problems of transferring the dual system of
training, we can fairly expect social capital regions (if the hypotheses about
social capital hold) to have more effective institutions for the resolutions of the
problems thrown up by the implementation of the training system, and we can
expect the production of more informal, spontaneous  cooperative actions to
tackle the problems of training reform.  The following two hypotheses relevant
to the resolution of training problems should be confirmed if social capital is in
fact the panacea of social ills:
Hsc1 : Small firms in regions of high social capital are more likely ceteris
paribus to join together among each other or with a neighboring large firm to
cover each other's deficiencies, thereby being able to take on a greater number
of apprentices than they otherwise could.
The rules of the German training system call for firms to meet fairly
stringent requirements with regard to the personnel and equipment necessary
to be approved by the IHK (or Handwerkskammer [Hwk] for craft firms) before
taking on apprentices.  Especially for small firms, which may have much more
limited equipment than that required to train a metal-working apprentice in
every aspect of the basic training (pneumatics, hydraulics, etc.), these IHK
equipment and staffing requirements are often onerous and pose a barrier to
taking on apprentices.  In the west, IHKs and private organizations have
established their own out-of-firm centers which provide much of the basic
metallurgy training for small firms in any given area.
The short time since German reunification has not yet allowed for the
establishment of a comparable network of training centers to support in-firm
training in the new federal states.  We might therefore expect firms in the new
federal states to cooperate to provide this function to each other.  It is just this
sort of spontaneous cooperation, not supported by formal institutions, which
firms in regions of high social capital should be able to demonstrate.
Hsc2:  Firms or firm representatives in regions of high social capital should be
better able than those in other regions to work together to take over apprentices
whose original firms face unexpected economic difficulty.
Since German reunification, the labor market in the new federal states has
been flooded with skilled laborers who have been made redundant from
companies that no longer exist.  With the rapid changes which have occurred
since the Wende in eastern German industrial structure (i.e., the dramatic fall in
average enterprise size), lots of firms have found and continue to find
themselves with apprentices whom they have trained but whom they are in no
position to hire.  Similarly, restructuring has also meant the collapse of many
large firms in the east.  In both situations, apprentices at the end or in the10
middle of their training programs suddenly find the time they have invested
there is worthless, as they are without a position.
Firms and managers have at least two reasons for wanting to avoid the
development of this type of situation.  The first is rather soft (or altruistic), but it
is one at least claimed by almost all personnel managers with whom I have
spoken:  after investing in and working with a youth over the course of a 3-4
year apprenticeship, managers do not want to leave youths with no alternatives
to unemployment.  On a personal level, it is not easy to say “thanks a lot for
working hard at these low wages, but we don’t have any jobs for you.  Auf
Wiedersehen.”  The manger’s second reason for hesitating is more self-
interested:  apprentices and potential apprentices who see that their pay-off in
the high-skill investment is not certain will be less likely to make that
investment.  Thus, from the incentive structure of the high-skill equilibrium,
managers want to make sure they can get their best apprentices a job
somewhere (if not in their own firm), because not doing so destabilizes the
incentive structures for other apprentices in the future.
Thus, firms on average want their apprentices to get jobs, if they are in fact
unable to hire them themselves—or, in the worst case, if they are unable to
complete the apprenticeship contract because they are going bust.  A further
reason noted by firms, but also and especially by firm representatives (the
chambers and the employers’ associations), is their fear that unions will seize
on this point to enshrine in a collective agreement the demand that all
apprentices be retained for at least a certain period of time after their
apprenticeships.  The better companies do at getting jobs for their trainees after
the apprenticeship period, the lower the chance that they will be forced to lose
a degree of flexibility in the negotiated wage agreement.
That is why firms want to get their apprentices hired, if they themselves do
not have jobs for them
7.  Where we might expect social capital to enter the
picture is in enabling firms to cooperate among themselves to deal with this
problem.  The links may be informal and one-off (I’ll call the personnel manager
I know from the Elks’ Club and see if he possibly needs to hire a mechanic) or
regularized (firms cooperate on a regular basis to find jobs for their apprentices
whom they cannot hire on their own).  Likewise, employers’ representatives
may be able to play on the density of network linkages in regions of high social
capital to deal with this admitted problem.
                                                          
7 In section 4, I will discuss in some detail why some types of firms (small Handwerk firms) are
likely to have lower average levels of training than other (IHK) firms.  This distinction is important
for reasons I will discuss below, but in this hypothesis I am trying to capture a phenomenon
which is common to both types of firms:  some exogenous shock (people staying in jobs longer
than expected, sales collapsing dramatically, or a firm going bankrupt) which reduces the
demand for skilled labor at the time when the apprentices finish their apprenticeship, which had
not been forecast when they started.11
3. Social Capital and Firm Selection
In selecting my regions for study, I prioritized 2 measurements of social capital
which are those most emphasized by Putnam (1993, 1995a and b):  social trust
and membership in (and the density of) secondary associations.  I originally
relied on survey data which used the standard survey measure of social trust
and questions on percentage of respondents belonging to at least one club (in
these surveys, club membership was clearly distinguished from membership in
a union or employer's association).  These data vary from survey to survey, and
generally lack large enough samples per Land to be able to assert strong
differences among Länder on these measures.  More succinctly:  the variance
among eastern states on conventional measures of social capital is erratic and
statistically insignificant.  What survey data do suggest, with a high degree of
confidence, is that western Germans are on average both far more likely to
belong to a club, and more likely to be trusting of people in general, than
eastern Germans.
To ensure that I would in fact be able to compare regions with differing
levels of social capital, I gathered more exact data on club membership in two
eastern states which appeared likely from the survey data to have varying
endowments of social capital, but that were not economically so dissimilar that
comparing them in the realm of training was equivalent to comparing Germany
to Bangladesh.  The measurement I used here was the Vereinsregister
maintained by all local courts in Germany.  Because any club with six or more
members acquires practical and legal advantages by registering officially, this
number seems the best available measurement of club density in Germany.
I discovered that, as suspected, Saxony has fewer people per club (230)
(inversely stated, more clubs per person, which means a higher measure of
social capital) than Saxony-Anhalt (249), but the difference is meager indeed.
Much more striking is the variance within each state.  In order to look at this
variance, I organized my inquiry along the lines of the Arbeitsamtsbezirk, which
is the local employment office district.  One of the jobs of the local employment
offices is to coordinate the process of matching apprentices with apprenticeship
places, and IHKs are sometimes organized according to Arbeitsamtsbezirke
(although this may not be so true in the western part of Germany, where the
Chambers and the Employment Offices were not established at the same
period in time).  Thus, many training programs and statistics are organized at
this level—making it a relevant one for study in a project devoted to the reform
of training.12
As depicted in the table below, the intra-Land variance on people per club
8
dwarfs the variances between Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt.  Also, for purposes
of increasing variance on the social capital variable, I gathered data for club
density in a Land—Rhineland-Palatinate—which appeared from the survey data
to be exceptionally well-endowed with trust and club-membership (I did not pick
a low social capital region in R-P, because it would not have been particularly
illuminating:  the lowest social capital region in R-P would be among the highest
social capital regions in Saxony or Saxony-Anhalt.)







Within Saxony, the variance is 70 people per club between Plauen and Leipzig;
in Saxony-Anhalt, Sangerhausen has 90 fewer people per club than Halle; and
the difference between Plauen (the highest social capital region in these two
eastern states) and Mayen (in the west) is as great as the variance between the
high and low social capital areas in Saxony.  If “social capital” as measured by
density of associational membership is indeed a reliable predictor of the
cooperative capacity of  regions, we should expect markedly more cooperative
behavior in the Mayen region than in the Halle region, and within each eastern
state we should expect this capacity to evince itself in Plauen (Sangerhausen)
more than in Leipzig (Halle).
                                                          
8 Remember, people per club is an inverse measure of social capital:  the fewer the people per club, the
more clubs there are for any given level of population.  This means that the more clubs there are per
person, the higher we assume the likelihood to be that people are more engaged in several different
social networks.  I follow Putnam in using this index as a measure of the density of social networks.
The (so-far untested) assumption here is that clubs have on average equal membership.  That
is, some clubs may have 10 members, some 100, but it all comes out in the wash, and there is no a
priori reason to assume that an aggregate measure of clubs per person refers to smaller (or larger)
levels of membership at one point than at another.  I do not know of work supporting this assumption
(which would count the membership of individual clubs and show that membership fluctuations in any
one club are very highly correlated with the number of clubs per person).  This remains a problematic
assumption, but I will for purposes of this paper not digress further on this subject.13
One point worth making in this context is the presence of two larger cities in
the two low-social-capital boxes.  Employment office districts tend to be
geographically encompassing (there are about ten districts per state in these
states).  But the city of Leipzig accounts for roughly two-thirds of the population
of the entire Arbeitsamtsbezirk Leipzig, and Halle and its surrounding county
(the Saalkreis) contribute fully three-fourths of the population of that district.
German sociologists have reported a relatively higher percentage of club
membership among small towns, although the data I have gathered are not
conclusive on the effect of population (a colleague who is gathering similar data
for all of Germany reports no correlation at all between club density and
population size).
In my dissertation research I am looking at two sectors in each of these 5
regions: the savings banks in services and the credit industry, and the metal
and electronics branch in the industrial sectors.  This paper reports my results
from the latter inquiry.  I chose the metal and electronics branch because of its
relatively even distribution in the states I was researching.  Within this branch, I
had hoped ideally to be able to select several mechanical engineering firms in
each of the five regions which had similar product markets and were of similar
size (measured by personnel and sales).  This is where my research design
met the real world.  The east German industrial fabric has been shredded by
the changes which have followed the monetary and political reunification of
Germany:  many firms have gone bankrupt, others have shed 90% or their
personnel, and lay-offs and plant closings continue to be a way of life.
As a result, to get at least five firms from each region, my firm selection had
to be much more wide-ranging (in terms of spectrum of size and product
offered) than I had originally hoped.  I ended up including firms from
mechanical engineering, steel-making, and electronics, concentrating mainly on
industrial firms (those registered with the IHK), but also including several who
belonged to the artisanal Chambers (Hwk), or even firms who belonged to both.
The firms ranged in size from 9 to more than 4500 employees.  All firms who
participated were guaranteed confidentiality, and so my data will necessarily
have to be presented in broad categories to help shield their identity.
The one firm which agreed to have its name used in conjunction with this
report was Siemens, because its situation is quite particular and is very easily
identifiable among the others.  While the headquarters of Siemens training is in
Leipzig, the company is organized such that the Leipzig training center
coordinates training for the entire southern half of the former GDR (including,
e.g., a plant in Sangerhausen).  Siemens was also the one firm which declared
explicitly that the final decisions on how many apprentices would be hired were
not taken within the Leipzig organization, but instead directly by the Munich
central office.  I include the Siemens results with the rest of the firm sample as
a helpful point of comparison, but it must be borne in mind that the Siemens14
training decisions affect several plants across southeastern German and these
decisions are made in Munich.
Below I present a table comparing the average and median number of
employees in the sample frame (potential firms selected for interview in the five
regions) and the same statistics for the firms which finally agreed to participate
in my study.
Table 2: Average (and median) number of employees in firms in the
sample frame and in the final sample




Leipzig 100 (40) 406 (200)
Plauen 226 (48) 364 (172)
Halle 160 (43) 337 (200)
Sangerhausen 162 (51) 82   (30)
Mayen 92  (43) 130  (48)
Note that in both the sample frame and in the final sample  there is a significant
degree of variance in the size of firms in the different regions.
One obvious trend to explain is the greater size of firms (except in
Sangerhausen) in the final sample as opposed to the sample frame.  This I
attribute to the division of labor in big firms.  In companies with under 100
employees, I generally talked to the company manager; in firms with 100-250
employees, my interlocutor was generally the director of personnel; and in the
largest firms, I usually spoke to directors of training.  I believe it is accurate to
say that the closer someone was to questions of training and personnel
qualification in their everyday work, the more likely they were to be interested in
my project (of course, there are training directors who refused to talk to me and
managers of small firms who were happy to speak with me)
9.  The trend is not
                                                          
9 There is a further source of potential bias in the firms who were willing to talk to me.  One might
assume that for a project on the reform of the training system, only the firms who trained would be
willing to talk to me.  To avoid this bias as much as possible, in the initial letter I sent out to firms, I
pitched my project as dealing with training policies and general personnel development strategies
inside the German metal and electronics industry.  I underlined that I was also interested in the
perspective of non-training firms.  I was pleased to note that, when the dust had settled, there was at
least one non-training firm in every regional sub-sample.15
so sharp in Mayen because there are not that many very large firms there in the
metal and electronics industries.  The one exception to this trend was in
Sangerhausen, where the biggest firms had all gone bankrupt, and only the
smaller firms were left
10.
The table below presents slightly more precise data on the distribution of
the firms according to size (measured by number of employees) across the 5
Arbeitsamtsbezirke
11.
Table 3:  Firm size (number of employees) by region
# of Employees: Less than
50
50<x<150 150<x<250 More than
250
Leipzig 10 4 1
Plauen 12 1 2
Halle 12 2 2
Sangerhausen 41 2 0
Mayen 40 2 1
One point to reiterate here is the heterogeneity of the firm profile of the regions.
Note that my firm samples for Mayen and Sangerhausen, two of the regions
which ranked high on social capital, tend to be dominated by small firms and
are essentially lacking very large firms (and in this respect, the samples are not
wildly at variance with the actual industrial structures of the regions). In the
subsequent tables I designate these four size categories as Small, Mittelstand1,
Mittlestand2,and Large.
                                                          
10Unemployment figures for the regions are also worth reporting.  In June, 1996, Plauen and Halle both
had unemployment rates around 16.5%, Leipzig 18%,  Sangerhausen almost 22%, and Mayen less than
8%.
11 In presenting the data about distribution of firms across the 5 regions, I  have tried to balance
the sometimes conflicting demands of shielding the identity of the firms while conveying as much
information as possible.  The size categories chosen here differ from those in an earlier draft of
this paper because the arbitrary cut-off point of 200 employees put into separate categories
firms which share many similarities.  The category having between 50 and 150 employees,
which I will designate as Mittelstand1, includes the larger Handwerk firms and a disparate group
of smaller industrial firms.   The category having between 150 and 250 employees includes
larger industrial firms which probably still consider themselves members of the Mittelstand  (thus
I call them Mittelstand2).   The large firms cover a wide range but tend to be on average much
larger than 250.16
4. Indices of Training
The willingness of firms to train—to take the plunge and invest in the potentially
unrecoverable development of human capital—is one of the key indices of
success of the training system.  If the western German dual system is to be
transferred successfully to the east, firms must be willing to bear the cost of
training.  There are a host of sticky methodological issues which complicate the
measurement and analysis of levels of training.  Most vexingly, the decision to
train is both an economic one and a social one:  that is, firms may train both
because they need future skilled labor (or they think it is a way to get cheap
labor) or because they view it as part of their duty as employers to provide
entry-level positions for the young.  Moreover, it is questionable whether the
answers provided by managers or personnel chiefs in a two hour interview will
accurately reflect which motives predominate.  Despite the uncertainty which
inevitably dogs such analysis, in this section I will discuss the two most
straightforward measures and try to make sense of some of the results.
First, and most intuitively, is the binary division between those firms which
train (at all) and those which do not (cf. Table 4 below).  Seven of the 34 firms
in my sample are not currently training.  There is one non-training firm in every
region in the sample, with three in Sangerhausen.   All the non-training firms
belong to the IHK (one belonged jointly to the Chamber of Crafts), and one of
the non-training firms belongs to the employer’s association.  With one
exception, the firms are in the Small category, the exceptional case belonging
to the Mittelstand1 category
12.  Because all firms in my sample with over 100
employees were training at least one apprentice, the table below compares
firms in only the Small (under 50 employees)  and Mittelstand1 (50-150
employees) categories.
                                                          
12 A 1992 survey of also found  that the vast  majority (around 90%) of non-training firms in the
new federal states had less than 50 employees (Von Bardeleben 1993).17
Table 4: To train or not to train? That is the question, for Small and
Medium-Size Firms
Arbeitsamt Size Training Now? Chamber Employer's
Association
Leipzig SM No IHK No
Plauen SM No IHK No
Plauen M1 Yes IHK Yes
Plauen M1 Yes Hwk No
Halle M1 No IHK No
Halle SM Yes Hwk No
Halle M1 Yes IHK/Hwk No
Sangerhausen SM No IHK No
Sangerhausen SM No IHK/Hwk No
Sangerhausen SM No IHK No
Sangerhausen SM Yes Hwk No
Sangerhausen M1 Yes IHK Yes
Mayen SM No IHK Yes
Mayen SM Yes IHK No
Mayen SM Yes IHK/Hwk No
Mayen SM Yes IHK/Hwk No
The one observation relevant to regional differentiation here is the very high
percentage of non-training firms in (high social capital) Sangerhausen.  As
noted earlier, Sangerhausen’s unemployment rate exceeds 20%, and almost all
of its big firms have disappeared since the Wende.  More even than other
regions of eastern Germany, the remaining firms in Sangerhausen can draw on
a pool of skilled labor which is now unemployed.  Overall, five of the seven non-
training firms in my sample (and two of the three from Sangerhausen) cited an
abundant supply of available skilled labor as a principal reason for which they
had not hired apprentices.  Three of the seven firms cited as well the lack of a
qualified trainer or too thin a workforce to be able to spare a qualified worker to
help with training.
A comparison of the smaller firms that do train with those that do not is
illustrative:  all the non-trainers are members of the IHK (one, a firm still owned
by the successor organizations of the Treuhandanstalt, is a member of both the
IHK and the Chamber of Crafts), while those small firms which do train largely
train in craft job classifications (Handwerksberufe).  In response to a question
about whether there were a subsidy program whose introduction would induce
them to train, the non-training firms answered unanimously in the negative:
there was no state program which could convince them to train.  In contrast,
both the eastern German small Handwerk firms which do train receive training18
subsidies from the Land government
13.  Thus, while smaller firms in eastern
Germany are clearly the most hesitant to train, it appears that IHK firms are
quite a bit more recalcitrant than Hwk firms to hire apprentices and less willing
to accept a cash payment to get over their unwillingness.
This observation segues cleanly into a discussion of the differences in the
costs of training and their implications for the behavior of firms in the German
dual system.  For all firms, the cost of training includes wages and social
contributions for apprentices, the cost of employing extra trainers (or the
opportunity cost lost by having skilled workers supervise trainees), necessary
equipment and instructional materials, and miscellaneous administrative costs.
The sum of these costs (including the wages of trainers) averaged close to
32,000 DM for IHK firms and 25,000 DM for Hwk firms in 1991 (Von
Bardeleben et al 1995: 7-8).  Yet these gross costs are deceptive for two
reasons.  First, depending on how early and to what extent they are integrated
into the work process, the labor of apprentices also brings some benefits for the
firm.  They may be doing a job less well than a fully-skilled worker, but they are
also getting paid less than a skilled worker.  Second, the real costs of hiring a
trainer depend on how much time (and when) a trainer is training.  For example,
in the training workshops of large industrial firms, there may be
Ausbildungsleiter whose only job is to supervise the apprentices in the
workshop; this trainer is doing almost nothing but training.  This contrasts
sharply with the case of a skilled worker who has an apprentice under his wing
in the work process, but who is also doing his own job.  He may well be able to
spend his time giving intensive instruction to the apprentice during times of
slack demand, that is, when he does not have much else to do anyway
(Soskice 1994).
Such considerations are not equally pertinent for all firms.  In particular, the
size of a firm and whether or not it belongs to the Industrial or the Crafts
Chamber affect the “net” costs of training.  In general, the larger the firm, the
more likely it is to have full-time trainers and a workshop area dedicated
exclusively to the training of apprentices.  The Federal Institute of Vocational
Training (BiBB) recently conducted a study of the cost of training to firms,
controlling both for the benefit to the firm of work performed by the apprentice
and for the fact that many “trainers” are in fact skilled workers who would work
for the firm whether or not it were training, using data provided by 1370 training
firms for the year 1991.  Thus calculated, the net cost of training for the
smallest German firms in 1991 was 1,647 DM, or 12 per cent of the total cost of
training for firms of this size (13,868 DM).
                                                          
13 A survey of 1500 eastern German firms conducted in 1993-1994 by the Federal Institute for
Vocational Training (BiBB) found that a slightly higher proportion of Handwerk than of IHK firms
which were currently training would not have trained in the absence of public subsidies (Degen
1995).19
In contrast, the total cost of training was over twice as high for firms having
over 500 employees (28,197 DM), and the net cost (17,886 DM) for these
larger firms makes up over 60 per cent of this (higher) total cost  ( V o n
Bardeleben et al 1995: 16).  Similarly, as a result of lower average training
wages in Handwerk, and the fact that Handwerk apprentices are integrated
more quickly into the workforce and bring a higher level of productivity at an
earlier stage than their counterparts in industry, the net cost of training for Hwk
firms is significantly lower than for IHK firms.  Thus, the same BiBB figures for
1991 reveal that, of an adjusted total training cost to IHK firms of 20,508 DM,
the net cost to the firm is 9,193 DM (just under half the total); yet of a lower
adjusted total cost to Handwerk firms of 12,936 DM, the net cost to firms is only
400 DM (three percent of total cost) (Von Bardeleben et al 1995: 15)
14
.
Since Handwerk firms are on average smaller than industrial firms, there is
a great deal of multicollinearity between the effects of firm size and the effects
of being an industry or crafts firm.  There is unfortunately very little empirical
work on this subject, aside from that already cited, so the exact contributions of
the two factors remain unclear; both seem to make a significant difference in
the cost of training to firms.  The data presented above on training and non-
training small firms in my sample suggests that IHK small firms have been less
willing than Hwk firms to take on apprentices, although this fact also has more
to do with the plentiful supply of skilled labor in the new federal states than with
the direct costs of training.  Partly because the craft sector was underdeveloped
in the GDR (systematically de-emphasized relative to big industry) and partly
because of this very favorable cost structure (including the possibility of public
aid in several of the new federal states), in-firm training positions in
Handwerksberufe have steadily increased in the new federal states over the
past few years (BMBW 1995: 54; Tagespiegel 6 Sept. 1995).  Although many
of these craft firms are still subsidized, it is not in Handwerk that the transition
of the dual system to eastern Germany is proving difficult.
In effect, as argued in Soskice (1994), there are two sectors in the German
training system:  one comprising Handwerk firms and one made-up of  IHK
firms
15.  As the discussion above has demonstrated, for many Handwerk firms
there is no reason to worry about losing money by investing in the training of a
worker who then absconds with her newly acquired skills to a competing firm;
                                                          
14 These “adjusted total costs” are lower than the total costs reported for IHK and Hwk firms in
the previous paragraph because they do not include some of the wage costs of  “training
personnel,” who in fact have other jobs in the firm.
15 David Soskice has influenced my thinking on this point, and the above paragraph relies largely
on the account developed in Soskice 1994.  In the real world, there is obviously a much less
clean bifurcation of types of firm training:  some firms (including some in my sample) train in
both Hwk and IHK job classifications, and the generalizations about the costs of training are
obviously aggregate averages which will vary considerably from one firm to another—or even
within one firm.  There are of course small firms in the Handwerk sector where training is
expensive and thorough, and larger IHK firms where the level of training is quite low.20
the net investment of the firm is often very close to zero.  We should then
expect that there is a more concerted effort by the IHK than by the Hwk firms to
retain their apprentices after training them.   And in fact, the retention rate of
German small firms (predominantly Handwerk, although we lack precise
numbers here) is much lower than that in larger firms, where (as discussed
above) the firm invests significantly more in the training per worker.  Thus the
retention rate of all firms with less than 50 workers is around .62, while the
retention rate of firms having more than 500 workers is about .85 (Büchtemann
1989 cited in Soskice 1994: 37; own calculations).  That is, small firms retain on
average six of every ten workers they train; large firms retain eight or nine of
every ten they train.  Small wonder, given the differential costs of the initial
investment.
It is relatively unproblematic for a government to transfer a system of
training regulations to a new environment, when that system costs the firms
nothing and allows them to be in charge of training their own workers or having
other means of sufficient access to skilled workers.  And this, grosso modo, is
the situation of training in the Handwerk sector in eastern Germany.  The
difficulties associated with the transfer of the training system will be most
severe for the IHK firms, but also potentially the most fruitful.  For it is in the
training patterns of IHK firms that we can observe the ideal-typical game laid
out in the introduction, whereby the firm has to be willing to make the
uncovered investment in the training of a skilled worker in order for both to be
able to reap the pay-off of the “high-skill equilibrium.”
The difference in the behavior of IHK and Handwerk firms in the area of
training should be reflected in the second index of training which I will use:  the
ratio of apprentices to total employees in a firm.  As we have seen in the above
discussion, IHK firms pay more (a lot more) per apprentice than do craft firms,
and they retain a much higher percentage of those they train.  The correlate of
this state of affairs is that IHK firms will maintain a lower ratio of apprentices to
total employees than do Hwk firms.  They want to hire almost all the trainees in
whom they have invested and do not want to make this (substantial) investment
in someone whom they are not planning to hire.  Handwerk firms, on the other
hand, lose little if anything in hiring apprentices and will therefore maintain (on
average) higher rates of apprentices in relation to their total employment than
the IHK firms (since they are going to let a higher percentage go after the
training is completed).
In western Germany, the rate considered by industrial firms and training
experts as that necessary to maintain the level of skilled workers is about six
per cent; that is, on average industrial firms need to train six apprentices per
100 total skilled workers to fill the gaps left by skilled workers moving on (to
other firms), moving up (to management positions), or moving out (to21
retirement)
16
.  In craft firms the rate is on average much higher (in excess of ten
per cent, although this figure varies).  Thus, in presenting the data on the ratio
of apprentices to total employment, I consider that IHK firms are indeed training
at the levels comparable to IHK firms in western Germany when the ratio is
within the margin of error of ± 2 per cent around the average of 6 per cent.
Those firms training above this level, unless they are growing at a phenomenal
rate, are training more workers than they will need to replace their workforce;
those training below this level are either still in post-Wende contraction or are
not investing at a sufficiently high level to be able to replace the skilled workers
lost to natural attrition.  Either case represents a divergence of training patterns
from those which maintain the dual system in the west.
Table 5  presents the data on training in firms in the five regions, with data
on firm size, to which Chamber firms belong, and whether or not they belong to
the main employer’s association.  The column labeled Trainees/Employment
presents the data on the proportion of apprentices to total employment.  I
grouped together firms belonging exclusively to the Handwerk Chamber with
firms belonging both to that chamber and to the IHK, because these firms
having dual membership train almost exclusively in Handwerksberufe.
Table 5 contains a lot of information, but the following observations are
particularly striking; I will discuss them in detail below.  First, as expected, firms
training in Handwerksberufe train at a higher average level (as a proportion of
total employees) than IHK firms in all four of the regions where they are
present
17
.  Second, and most counter-intuitive (given the above discussion), is
the fact that most of the IHK firms in Mayen (which is in western Germany) train
below the target range which I have defined as typical of western Germany;
only one firm there is training close to the six per cent number.  Conversely,
Siemens, a west German training firm par excellence (listed in Table 5 after all
the other Leipzig firms) is training in southeastern Germany at a rate which far
exceeds my target range.  What is going on here?  Third, among the eastern
German cases, Sangerhausen is the only region in which no IHK firms are
training in the target range.  The smaller firms there are not training at all, and
the those larger firms who are training in Sangerhausen are training at either
                                                          
16 This figure is uncontroversial and was cited to me by a number of people familiar with training
in the industrial firms (in the employer’s associations, in the IHK, in firms themselves, and by
academics).  In using this measure to assess the patterns of training of firms in my sample, I
use a margin of error of ±2 per cent, since the six per cent is approximate.
17 My sample for Leipzig contained no Handwerk firms.  However, in Leipzig there is one outlier
IHK company whose proportion of apprentices/workforce is .465.  That is, the firm has as many
almost as many apprentices as workers.  This firm was reorganized in 1995 after the break-up
and privatization of a large Kombinat, and the firm has taken on all the apprentices of the entire
former Kombinat to allow all the apprentices to finish their training and receive their certification.
The newly reorganized firm has no intention of maintaining this ridiculously high proportion of
apprentices to total workforce in the future.22
very low or very high rates.  Plauen has the most IHK firms in the targeted
range (three), followed by Leipzig with two, and Halle with one.





Leipzig Small 0.0% IHK No
Leipzig Mittelstand2 1.6% IHK Yes
Leipzig Mittelstand2 2.9% IHK Yes
Leipzig Mittelstand2 6.2% IHK Yes
Leipzig Large 7.0% IHK Yes
Leipzig Mittelstand2 46.5% IHK No
Leipzig Large 12.0% IHK Yes
Plauen Small 0.0% IHK No
Plauen Mittelstand1 1.6% IHK Yes
Plauen Large 4.9% IHK Yes
Plauen Mittelstand2 7.0% IHK Yes
Plauen Large 8.0% IHK Yes
Plauen Mittelstand1 13.1% Hwk No
Halle Mittelstand1 0.0% IHK No
Halle Large 2.2% IHK No
Halle Mittelstand2 2.3% IHK Yes
Halle Large 5.4% IHK Yes
Halle Mittelstand2 14.0% IHK Yes
Halle Small 9.5% Hwk No
Halle Mittelstand1 11.6% IHK/Hwk No
Sangerhausen Small 0.0% IHK No
Sangerhausen Small 0.0% IHK No
Sangerhausen Mittelstand2 2.2% IHK No
Sangerhausen Mittelstand2 14.0% IHK No
Sangerhausen Mittelstand1 15.1% IHK Yes
Sangerhausen Small 0.0% IHK/Hwk No
Sangerhausen Small 16.7% Hwk No
Mayen Small 0.0% IHK Yes
Mayen Large 0.3% IHK No
Mayen Small 2.5% IHK No
Mayen Mittelstand2 2.6% IHK No
Mayen Mittelstand2 5.5% IHK No
Mayen Small 6.3% IHK/Hwk No
Mayen Small 11.4% IHK/Hwk No23
First, training at Siemens.  Siemens’ internal policy on training is to aim at a rate
of apprentices equal to six per cent of the total number of skilled workers
18.
Between 1992 and 1995, after using this measure to determine its need for
apprentices, Siemens hired one hundred extra apprentices (that is, above the
calculated need for replacing their skilled workers) per year in eastern
Germany, because of the lack of in-firm training places available to eastern
German youth.  Without these extra places, then, Siemens would be training
very much in the target range.
Of the other large firms in the sample training in the target range, only two
others claimed to be training above need.  In Plauen, the firm with a proportion
apprentices/employment of eight per cent claimed to be training slightly over
need; and the large firm in Leipzig, which is in fact owned by the Treuhand and
is in charge of decision-making for several plants in eastern Germany, trains far
above need.  In the latter case, the survival of the individual plants themselves
is very much in doubt and they are all shedding labor, so the predicted future
need for skilled labor is zero.  Thus, only this Treuhand firm is a spurious entry
for the firms training at the target level.  I will return to the question of training
over need below.  But as a ballpark figure for IHK metal and electronics firms,
the range around six per cent represents the best available rough average of
the demand for apprentices which is necessary to replenish losses of skilled
labor through retirement or attrition.
The Mayen results are, though, puzzling.  Because my research question is
concerned mainly with eastern Germany, I devoted the bulk of my time and
resources there.  As discussed in section II, the criterion used in selecting
Mayen as a comparison case was the high levels of “social capital” measured
there, not the typical nature of the training structure there.  But these results
cannot just be ignored.  One explanation is that which was given by the firms
themselves in the course of my interviews in Mayen:  the four firms having the
lowest ratios of trainees/employees all mentioned that they were in fact atypical
in comparison with other industrial firms, in that their staff comprised a relatively
higher proportion of  engineers (or an especially high proportion of employees
in development) to skilled workers than other firms in the industry.   Their
personnel recruitment strategies thus focused more on the recruitment of
graduates from local Fachhochschulen or technical universities.  Two of the
four made reference to the advantage conferred in recruitment by having
several of these technical institutes of higher education in the area.
A concentration of smaller firms relying on their ability to make specialized
high-end products and drawing personnel from local institutions of higher
                                                          
18 In fact, this policy is currently operationalized as three per cent of of the total number of
employees who are working for the firm who have ever been through a Siemens apprenticeship.
The two rates are functionally equivalent, according to a Siemens director of training, because
so many Siemens employees move into management positions later.24
learning recalls the themes harped on by the observers of the famed industrial
districts of the Third Italy and Baden-Württemberg (Piore and Sabel 1984,
Sabel 1994b).  However, those scholars who have done extensive work on
these regional economies have grown increasingly skeptical of the “faded
virtues”
19 of the skill formation system associated with these regions in
Germany.  The dual system now, according to these critics, tends to instill
invidious skill hierarchies whose inflexibility leaves German firms ill-suited to
cope with the demands of cooperative production—the reintegration of
conception and execution—which is afoot in some sectors of the industrial
economies today.  The dual system may produce great mechanics and great
electricians, but it falls way short in producing a mechanic and an electrician
who can easily work together in developing new product drawing on their
shared expertise (Herrigel 1995, Sabel 1995).  This raises the following
question in the context of this study:  am I using a static view of training in
western Germany to assess the success of the transfer of institutions of training
to the east, while, as in Mayen, western German firms are deserting the dual
system because it fails to meet their current needs for workers who are as
skilled in the art of cooperation as they are in the technical mastery of a
mechanical specialty (cf. Regini 1996)?
While this question cannot be answered with certainty, given the paucity of
comparative data for western German firms, the data available do suggest
Mayen is more of an exception than a precursor of changes underway in the
engagement of western German firms.  First, as noted above, the firms
following these strategies see themselves as being exceptional cases within
their own industry.  Second, results from a 1993 survey of west German firms
indicate that a majority of firms are happy with the content of the technical
Berufe in the dual system, and firms which pursue product market strategies
based on rapid innovation plan to maintain or increase their use of apprentices
in the future (BMBW 1995: 45-49).  Finally, on an illustrative level, there is the
example of one of the Mayen firms whose production supervisor was very
consciously trying to adopt the innovations of production argued by Sabel
(1995)  to be incompatible with the German system of skill acquisition.  This
supervisor spoke proudly of the introduction of group work and of how a new
facility had been built to allow the development and production workers to work
together more closely, but also confirmed that apprentices continued to be the
best source of skilled workers for the firm.  In this firm, at least, there was no
evidence of worries about the nefarious impact of skill hierarchies through the
dual system.  We should be wary, then, of drawing  a doom-and-gloom story of
the future of the dual system from the Mayen results
20.
                                                          
19 The title of an article by Horst Kern and Charles Sabel (1994) on the crisis of the German
model of production.
20 In comments on an earlier draft of this paper, Sabel objected that he does not argue that the
German system is incapable of change, but rather that the current system should not be having
the problems he has observed, if it indeed continues to have the virtues of flexible adjustment
attributed to it by Soskice and Streeck.  He argues that the system may well be able to adapt,
but only by departing from some of the stabilizing (craft) features lauded by its admirers (cf.25
What we fail to  see in the Mayen firms, as in the firms from the four
regions of eastern Germany, is any pattern of correlation between social capital
and the willingness of firms to train.  No surprise there, since even the hardiest
social capital advocate would be recalcitrant to say that embeddedness in a
cooperative milieu is the number one factor determining the willingness to and
level which firms will train.  Rather, the social capital variable can fairly be
expected to come into play in the cooperative solutions of problems among
firms, as elaborated in the first section.  I will discuss the evidence on these
particular hypotheses in the following section.
One variable of particular importance in the training decision of a firm
appears to be its ownership structure, and in particular, whether or not it is
owned by a company in  western Germany.
Table 6 presents the list of firms in my sample owned by firms in western
Germany
21.  With one exception—that of the Leipzig firm owned by the
successors of the Treuhand, whose specificity I noted above—all the IHK firms
which train in the target range are owned by western German firms.  This is
perhaps not surprising, given that ownership of eastern German enterprises
tends to be concentrated (concentration increasing with firm size) and that
western German firms and families are the biggest owners of eastern German
firms (Carlin and Mayer 1995).  According to Carlin and Mayer, one of the
primary benefits of this ownership structure for eastern German firms is the
access to long-term finance conferred by the collateral and reputational effects
of their western German owners.  This argument with these data certainly
provide correlational evidence that, as predicted by the coordinated economy
model, the access of firms to long-term finance is an important facilitating
variable in allowing them to choose training strategies consonant with the high-
skill equilibrium.  This is only a correlation, and in my study I did not gather the
micro-level data which would be necessary to tie a firm’s training strategy to its
access to finance.  But the notable correlation does provide a potential
confirmation of the predictions of David Soskice’s institutional model.
                                                                                                                                                                         
Sabel 1994a: fn 4).  The object of my anecdote from Mayen is to question the (supposedly
calamitous) effect of skill hierarchies in impeding the integration of conception and execution.
21 Table 6 presents ownership of firms as of the time of interview (winter 1995-96).  Two firms
still owned by the Treuhand were in the process of privatization, but the sale was not final at the
time of interview; these firms are excluded from this table.26












However, as shown in Table 6, there are some exceptional cases, where
western ownership does not suffice for the firm to train at western levels.  First,
in Leipzig, two IHK firms classified as Mittelstand2 are owned by western
owners, and exports constitute more than half their sales markets; yet their
proportion of apprentices to employment remains below the targeted range.
There is an easy explanation:  1995 was the first year that these two firms hired
apprentices.  If they continue to hire apprentices at this rate over the next three
years (which they intend to do), they will be training at or even slightly above
the target range.  Both, however, receive very generous support from a subsidy
program of the Saxon government, a subject to which I will return later.  The
Sangerhausen firm owned by a company in western Germany is training under
the target range because the extraordinarily high unemployment in




Finally, there are three IHK cases (besides the two special cases explained
above) which train (far) in excess of the target range.  Two of these are firms
owned by the successor to the Treuhand; one is a former PGH
(Produktionsgenossenschaft des Handwerks) whose ownership is parceled up
among a large number of individuals.  Recall from the discussion above that
firms training above the eight per cent barrier are probably training above the
level necessary to replenish their workforce.  Thus, they are likely either to be
growing very rapidly, paying less per trainee than the IHK average, or making
training decisions based on criteria different from those of narrow profit-
maximizing.  None of these three firm is growing rapidly; in fact two have cut
their labor forces quite dramatically in the years since the Wende.  Instead, a
combination of the second and third reasons come into play—on the one hand,
                                                          
22 Over the past two years, this firm had hired only three apprentices but had hired forty workers
directly off the labor market.27
the costs of training at the Treuhand firms has been subsidized massively; on
the other hand, two of the three firms located in Sangerhausen are training
above their estimated need for the future.
To summarize the results of this section:  it appears that IHK firms owned
by western German firms—that is, those already embedded in the institutional
system of the west, notably with the access to long-term finance which that
entails—are those most likely to train at the levels associated with high-skill
equilibrium.  In the next section, we examine evidence on some of the more
specific hypotheses laid out in the first section.
5. Evidence from the firm interviews
5.1. Institutionalist Hypotheses:
HI1:  The employer's association and/or the IHKs provide firms with advice and
guidelines for training, including the diffusion of best practice in different sorts of
jobs.
The evidence on this hypothesis is mixed.  In all the regions and across all
firm sizes, those firms which trained generally judged the guidelines regulated
by the IHK as satisfactory.  In several cases (especially in the larger firms), the
firms said that they crafted these "very general" guidelines to meet their specific
needs, by doing supplementary courses or including supplementary
qualifications. The general  guidelines have been negotiated at national level by
representatives named by the employers' associations and the unions (for
metal industries, by Gesamtmetall and the IG Metall) under the auspices of the
Federal Institute for Vocational Training.   Some managers, particularly those in
small firms, evinced dissatisfaction with the multiplicity of requirements.  Not
every worker needs to have a 3.5 year apprenticeship, they claimed, and these
requirements either impeded them from hiring in the first place, or made it
difficult for them to hire less qualified candidates whom they might otherwise
have hired.
Where the evidence diverges from the coordinated economy explanation of
the governance of training is in the relative importance of the employers'
association—which is private and has voluntary membership--and the IHK,
which is semi-public and to which all firms must belong.  The employers'
association does play a role in negotiating the guidelines established and
overseen by the IHK; this is regulated by law.  However, the negotiation of new28
certifiable professions (Berufe) is a relatively rare event.  Once the guidelines
are established, the employers' association appears to play little role in the
continual diffusion of new ideas and of "best practice" in training.  Its only role is
to be the political arm of the firms if they want to negotiate changes in the
guidelines to the Berufe.  Firms made reference far more often to their
meetings and information exchanges with other trainers in other firms through
the IHK.
The value placed on these contacts through the IHK with other training
firms varied.  Almost all IHK firms which trained agreed that the IHK was a
necessary supervisory agency over training practices, to make sure firms
adhered to reasonable standards and to test and certify apprentices at the end
of their training.  Most training or personnel directors from medium or large
companies played a role on the IHK testing committees.  Some of these
thought the supplementary contacts to training personnel in other firms was
helpful, others (in half the very large firms) thought the IHK was more important
as a resource for small or medium size companies.
To summarize my findings on the first institutionalist hypothesis (HI1):  aside
from its role in negotiating the content of new Berufe—which is not irrelevant,
but which is also quite general—the  employers' association plays only a minor
role in the diffusion of advice relevant to training, and there is no evidence to
show that it systematically diffuses information about "best practice" in training.
In comparison with the employers' association, the IHKs play a more visible and
relevant role in the supplying of information for firms on questions of training.
On the question of "best practice," firms tend to rely more on themselves and
do not suggest that the IHK regularly gives them useful advice in the best way
to construct their own training program.  So advice and guidelines are provided,
but this advice is not central to the management or establishment of training
programs within a firm.
HI2:  In order to fulfill this role, employer's associations and/or IHKs have
access to inside (potentially sensitive) information of firms; firms are willing to
provide the association with this access.
First, it bears noting that most firms thought that there was very little inside
information associated with training which they considered sensitive
23 (I have
heard that some banks do regard their training curricula as highly sensitive, but
not in the course of this inquiry).
When pressed—"say there were some piece of information you considered
relatively important, in the realm of training, for maintaining the competitive
                                                          
23 The BDA representative to the general committee of the federal training institute noted, in
response to a question about inside information impeding inter-firm training cooperation, that
“everywhere firms cook with water, and in any case secrets are not exchanged [in such
cooperation over apprenticeship]” (BiBB 1995:30).29
position of your firm.  Would you trust the employers' association with such
information?"—I received no evidence that supported HI2.  Firms neither feel
the need for information from the employer's association nor do they
demonstrate an overwhelming propensity to share it.
Academic partisans of the employers’ association can point to two
characteristics of my sample in order to discount its findings relative to HI1 and
HI2.  First, few of these firms are likely to be at the cutting edge of innovation,
since most of the sample firms are in eastern Germany; and second, there are
very few large firms in my sample, and it is the very large firms which most use
and benefit from the services of the employers’ association
24.  The first
response is only partially valid:  as depicted in the last column of Table 5,
several of the larger Mittelstand firms from Rhineland-Palatinate are very much
on the cutting edge of technology in volatile markets, and none of these firms
has felt the need to join the association (one of the firms quit the association in
1994 because they felt that it catered more to the needs of mass producers
than to their specialized line of production).  Second, while it may be true that
the majority of the most innovative firms are in western Germany, several of the
firms in my sample have made massive investments since 1990 and are now
very confident that their plant and workers will out-perform those in western
Germany in the years to come.
To give this critique its due, however, I cite in this paragraph the views of
the officials in charge of training at the three eastern German firms in my
sample with more than 1000 employees—all owned by well-known western
German conglomerates—plus one interview with an equally large firm (also part
of a western German conglomerate) in Berlin and Brandenburg.  One of the
interviewees belongs to the national level working group of Gesamtmetall,
which he said meets two or three times per year and in which the topics are
“political; nothing technical is discussed.”  Another, in talking about the regional
working of the employer’s association which meets twice a year, agreed that
these meetings provided a chance to exchange information with colleagues at
other firms, adding “but our competitors are there, so there is information that
we hold back.”  A third trainer from a very large firm said that in fact the IHK
was “closer to home” than the regional employers’ associations and that he had
information exchanges twice a year with other trainers through the IHK,
commenting that at such meetings, “firms do learn from each other and try to
help each other, but if they were in competing sectors there might be taboo
areas.”
25  The fourth summarized the role of the employers’ association as
drumming up extra in-firm training places (when they are lacking, as in eastern
                                                          
24 Thanks to Steve Casper for playing the devil’s advocate in this case.
25 Those with exceedingly short memories will say that, in fact, the German model of competition
is based on firms which do not compete head-on, so the theoretical problem of “taboo areas” of
information exchange does not arise in reality.  I refer such commentators to the previous
sentence above, in which it is clear that at least some big firms are competing head-on and
therefore withholding information from the association.30
Germany) or proposing official changes to the content of the Berufe (which, as
noted above, have to be negotiated with the union at a national level).  Thus,
the big firms in my sample agree:  there is no diffusion of best practice through
the employers’ association, and some hesitate to share information with either
the employers’ association or the IHK.
HI3:  The employer's association possesses a sanctioning mechanism to
identify and punish firms which poach the trained workers of other firms rather
than (or in addition to) training their own apprentices.
Other than expulsion, the employer's association possesses no sanctioning
capacity.  Even very large firms in my sample admitted to the lack of recourse
available through the employers' association to punish firms which poached
their most highly skilled workers.  In one case, one of the very large eastern
German firms raised its wages to parity with the western rate in 1991, because
it had no other means of holding onto its skilled workers, who were being
poached by firms in the west.
It should also be noted that the very concept of poaching appeared risible
to many eastern German employers; in such a collapsed labor market, the
prospect of poaching was the most academic of questions.  In Mayen, firms
admitted to having poached or having been poached from, but again said there
was no recourse for a firm which loses an apprentice or employee this way.
The employers' association provides no sanctions in these cases.
5.2. Social Capital Hypotheses
Hsc1 : Small firms in regions of high social capital are more likely ceteris
paribus to join together among each other or with a neighboring large firm to
cover each other's deficiencies, thereby being able to take on a greater number
of apprentices than they otherwise could.
Table 7 (below) depicts the percentage of the firms who are training in
partnership with other firms, as a percentage of the firms who are training at all.
We should expect, as suggested in the first social capital hypothesis, that
cooperative efforts among firms will be relatively more prevalent in areas of
high social capital.
The evidence in Table 7 clearly refutes the second hypothesis.  In both
eastern states, the lower social capital regions have a higher percentage of
firms who train in partnership with other firms than do the higher social capital
regions. This is unlikely to be a product of the heterogeneity of the firm sizes in31
each region, because either large firms or small firms can be involved in a
partnership—the large firms tending to play the role of the überbetriebliche
centers in the west.  A potential counter-argument, though, could posit that the
absence of large firms in Sangerhausen makes it significantly more difficult to
establish firm partnerships centered on a large firm.  While this is reasonable, it
is contradicted by the evidence from Plauen and Leipzig:  Plauen, with larger
firms on average than Leipzig, has fewer partnerships (as a percentage of total
firms training).  The evidence on this hypothesis is clear:  the existence of a
high density of clubs does not predispose firms to cooperate to establish
partnerships in training.
Table 7:  Firms which train in partnership as a percentage of all training
firms in a region
Arbeitsamt Size (general) Azubi Quote IHK/HWK Partnership?
Leipzig Mittelstand2 1.6% IHK Yes
Leipzig Mittelstand2 2.9% IHK Yes
Leipzig Mittelstand2 6.2% IHK No
Leipzig Large 7.0% IHK Yes
Leipzig Mittelstand2 46.5% IHK Yes
Leipzig Large 12.0% IHK Yes
Plauen Mittelstand1 1.6% IHK No
Plauen Large 4.9% IHK Yes
Plauen Mittelstand2 7.0% IHK Yes
Plauen Large 8.0% IHK No
Plauen Mittelstand1 13.1% Hwk No
Halle Large 2.2% IHK No
Halle Mittelstand2 2.3% IHK Yes
Halle Large 5.4% IHK Yes
Halle Small 9.5% Hwk No
Halle Mittelstand1 11.6% IHK/Hwk No
Halle Mittelstand2 14.0% IHK No
Sangerhausen Mittelstand2 2.2% IHK No
Sangerhausen Mittelstand2 14.0% IHK No
Sangerhausen Mittelstand1 15.1% IHK No
Sangerhausen Small 16.7% Hwk Yes
Siemens trains in partnership in its plants in Sangerhausen and in Leipzig.
80% of the training in Leipzig (excluding Siemens) are training in partnership.
40% of the firms training in Plauen are training in partnership.
33% of the firms training in Halle are training in partnership.
25% of the firms training in Sangerhausen (excluding Siemens) are training in
partnership.32
The data on partnership require one other comment as well.  It is clear from the
table that firms in the two regions in Saxony are more likely to train in
partnership than either region in Saxony-Anhalt.  The reason is very simple:
money.  The most lucrative form of public subsidy for training in the new federal
states (excluding Treuhand aid) is the program for training partnerships passed
in 1995 by the state government in Saxony.  One of the firms in Sangerhausen,
in fact, complained about the unwillingness of the state government in Saxony-
Anhalt to provide financial support for a proposed partnership which had been
organized among local firms.  I have not yet looked in detail at the various sorts
of programs used by different firms in different regions, so I am not yet able to
speak definitively to this issue.  What is clear from the Saxon example, though,
is that clever (or just generous) policy design may be more effective than deep
and dense networks of associational life in helping firms to work together with
one another in the area of training.
Hsc2:  Firms or firm representatives in regions of high social capital should be
better able than those in other regions to work together to take over apprentices
whose original firms face unexpected economic difficulty.
The second hypothesis on social capital fares slightly better than Hsc1.
First, in high unemployment Sangerhausen (where we would most expect to
see such action among firms, given the very high unemployment there), the IHK
served as the coordinating center for finding places for the apprentices of
SAMAG, the largest metal firm in the area, which went bankrupt in 1994.
Within my sample, three of the four training firms agreed to take on SAMAG
apprentices in the middle of their contracts, in order to allow them to finish their
apprenticeships.  The firms which agreed to take on the apprentices were
promised compensation by the Land government, but the compensation is to
be paid only at the end of the apprenticeships (and some of the apprentices
had only just begun in 1994 when the firm went belly up).  Some of the firms
expressed doubts as to whether or not they would ever actually see the money
from the state.  The presence of SAMAG apprentices is part of the explanation
for the very high ratio of trainees to employees at the two IHK firms training at a
high level in Sangerhausen.
This evidence is pretty weak, alone:  sure, the firms agreed to take on the
apprentices, but only to let them finish their apprenticeships (with no
guarantees of jobs at the end), and the state was going to subsidize them as
well.  And maybe such an event could have happened in other regions, if they
were in as economically catastrophic a state as in Sangerhausen.  However, in
the employment champion of my sample—Mayen, in Rhineland-Palatinate—the
largest employers in the area (across several different sectors) have, at the
behest of the IHK, formed a committee to deal with apprentices whose
companies have to release them during the course of apprenticeship because
of economic difficulty. Having set up the committee, the IHK has withdrawn33
from its functioning; the manager of the largest firm in the area is now the
chairman of the committee, and it remains as an independent and voluntary
club of the employers in the area to deal with apprentices in this situation.
In Plauen, I saw no evidence of such an organizational response as
witnessed in Mayen or in Sangerhausen.  However, in the largest firm in my
sample in Plauen, there was an inordinately high number of apprentices who
finished last year,  because the firm had taken on an unusually high number of
apprentices in 1991-2, under pressure from the IHK and the employment office
(a year when the apprenticeship market was in particular crisis).  In this case,
the firm’s director of training intervened through the local employment office
and ensured that all eight (extra) apprentices received jobs.  Several firms had
this problem in the various regions of my sample, but this case in Plauen was
the only one in which a manager reported taking action through local agencies
and having success.  Is the case more than anecdotal?  Hard to say.  What I
can say is that no firms in either Halle or Leipzig reported such activity, either
organizationally or individually, aimed at finding places for their own apprentices
they were unable to retain because of downsizing of the workforce.
Nevertheless, we must be extremely cautious about drawing any broader
conclusions from this scanty evidence.  It is certainly within the realm of
possibility that this correlation is random.  However, using the same semi-
structured questionnaire at all 34 firms, I only uncovered the cases noted above
in those three regions.  What I did not uncover is any systematically higher rate
of satisfaction or greater frequency of interaction with the IHKs or with the
employers’ associations in these regions.
Thus, my conclusions about the effect of social capital must be extremely
modest at this point.  With respect to Hsc2, firms in high social capital regions
have shown a greater creativeness and resourcefulness in coping with
problems of the training system.  But a high endowment of social capital does
not lead to the more efficient functioning of the principal institutions of training.
The impact of social capital appears marginal, rather than central, in helping
firms or institutions to cope with the problems of training reform.
6. Discussion
These data, as noted throughout, do not tell a clear story.  The heterogeneity of
my firm sample makes all comparisons across regions problematic.  Yet, for all
the product market variation among firms, the firm sub-samples are not
inconsistent with their regions:  there are very few large metal firms in the
Mayen area, and the changes since the Wende have eliminated all big firms34
from the Sangerhausen region.  It is probable that this small firm structure
bears some relation to the data on club density, although I am not prepared to
speculate further on those causal links right now.  As the Plauen case
suggests, though, the presence of big firms is not inconsistent with the
presence of high club density.  But, given these caveats, on to some (still
cautious) speculation about what these data might mean for the two theories I
have been testing.
As regards the diffusion of information and advice to companies, firms in
the east, like those in the west, do indeed seem to use and (in some cases)
appreciate the advice of the IHKs and the employers' associations.  The level of
detail of this information, however, is somewhat less than that hypothesized by
Soskice—in both the east and the west.  Negotiated guidelines regulated by the
IHKs form the framework of the system, but this regulation does not translate
into the repeated diffusion of information about best practice and the latest
innovations in methods of training.
Moreover, and this is especially true for smaller firms, the prime mover in
the training system is not the employers' association, but rather the IHKs.
Member firms regard the employer's association as particularly helpful for
getting information about available government subsidies.  Also, some firms
prefer to go the employers' associations rather than the IHKs for legal advice
relevant to training, although the evidence here is mixed.  For technical advice,
though, firms do not go to the employers' associations; they go to the IHKs, or
more often, rely on connections within their conglomerates (in the case of large
firms), or to the community of trainers that antedate the Wende.
In neither the exhortative nor the punitive role has the employers'
association shown the capacity attributed to it in the (employer-dominated)
coordinated market economy model.  Very few firms report receiving—and
none reports responding favorably to—appeals from the employers' association
to create extra training places.  And the sanctioning capacity of the association
against members that poach is nil.
The greater relative importance of the IHKs for training, de facto as well as
de jure, is more than a semantic quibble about what organization of employers
is managing the "coordination" of the economy.  Gesamtmetall and the BDA, as
agents of (especially the large) private firms, have voluntary membership and
are political representatives of their member firms.  The IHKs have a nebulous,
para-public status.  All industrial firms must belong (Zwangsmitgliedschaft), and
many questions of local training policy go through the
Berufsausbildungsausschuß of the IHK, in which the unions have voting35
representation equal to that of the employers
26.  While the difference with the
coordinated market economy model should not be drawn too starkly, this
evidence suggests that coordination of training in Germany is a bit less
employer-coordinated, and a bit more negotiated by public bodies comprising
equal representation of capital and labor, than that model would posit.
Compared to the findings on social capital, however, the predictions of the
coordinated economy model stand up relatively well.  Neither the IHKs nor the
regional employers’ associations perform more effectively in the regions of high
social capital than in the regions of low social capital.  As demonstrated in the
discussion of Hsc1, the cooperative capacity of firms does not seem to be
increased by being imbricated in a club-rich region.  It may be that
Sangerhausen's very high unemployment swamps any network effect, but for
whatever reason, bowling clubs don't lead to training partnerships. The
discussion of Hsc2 suggests, though, that firms in high social capital regions do
outperform firms in other regions in using collective action to find places for
apprentices when their original firms cannot complete the apprenticeship, or
cannot hire the apprentices afterwards.  Yet the evidence here is rather thin.
Thus, if the measurement of club density is accurate and indicative of the
presence of trust and networks of civic engagement which constitute social
capital, it does not appear that firms in these regions regularly draw on these
social resources in order to solve the wide range of problems associated with
training reform.
Most of the German firms with which I conducted interviews, especially
those training in the target range, did underline the importance of information
exchange or regular contacts among trainers from different firms.  But the
density of these links had nothing to do with social capital measurements, and
even for a majority of members of the employers’ association, the association
was not the principal organizational conduit for exchanging information with
other firms.  The very large firms which belonged to western conglomerates
found the regularly scheduled opportunities for information exchange with other
firms in the conglomerate particularly helpful.  Trainers (or personnel managers)
from large and medium size firms were almost all involved in the testing
commissions of the IHK for one of the Berufe in which they trained, and all
agreed that this role constituted an excellent way to get to know the trainers
and (sometimes) the training practices of firms in the area.  Medium size firms
thought this information helpful for the improvement of their own training,
whereas trainers from the largest firms placed a higher value on the information
                                                          
26 The German unions, despite their equal representation in the training committees of the IHKs,
maintain that the IHK is fundamentally an employer organization, and would like to see the governance
of training moved more directly under the control of the state.36
gleaned through their own conglomerates or through personal links with other
trainers.
My data suggest that the possibilities for exchange afforded by an active
role on the testing commission were among the connections most frequently
cited by trainers as useful.  In some medium size firms in eastern Germany,
though, trainers or personnel managers were involved in a network of people
with whom they had associated through the local community of trainers in the
GDR.  The administration of the GDR training system brought trainers from
different firms (sometimes in the same Kombinat, sometimes not) together on a
more regular basis than occurs under western German training regulations.
The links established during that time have been helpful for the learning
process involved in the adjustment to western German practices.  Some
individuals indicated that they maintained links with trainers in other (now
independent) firms that had belonged to the same Kombinat before 1989-1990,
but the majority of firms in the east said such links through the network of the
former Kombinate are of little (or declining) importance for them.  These firms in
the east are clearly using a variety of formal and informal networks to gather
information in the implementation of training policy; but these networks are not
those which the theoretical literature in political economy have emphasized.
A final variable which my discussion has avoided until now is the role of
public policy and public money.  The West German dual system relies on firms
to pay for their own training; as a result, there are no direct subsidies for in-firm
training
27
.  The system in eastern Germany has not worked on this no-aid
principle, but has instead been supported by a raft of European Union, federal,
Treuhand, and Land-level programs (cf. Johnson 1995).  Officially, the federal
and EU aid has been aimed exclusively at creating out-of-firm training places
for those would-be apprentices who could not find a position in a firm.  This aid
through the Gemeinschaftsinitiative Ost (GIOst) created 6093 extra places in
1993, 12,070 places in 1994, and 12,940 places in 1995 (BMBW 1996: 29).
The cost of the 1995 aid alone was estimated, over the course of the
apprenticeships funded, to cost around 870 million DM (Tagespiegel 31 August
1995).
This GIOst aid has only sponsored out-of-firm places.  The federal
government has insisted on this point in order to assure that the principle of the
dual system, in which firms pay for in-firm training, remains sacrosanct.  Within
Gesamtmetall, the national employer’s association in the metal-working
industries, the government’s policy has been fiercely debated, but was opposed
                                                          
27 Some smaller firms are able to circumvent this problem by getting public financial support for
the modernization or expansion of their plant, aid which is tied to the size of employment (and
thus increases with the hiring of additional apprentices).  Only one small Handwerk firm in my
western German sample had been able to use this means of financing, so the stylized fact of no
supported in-firm training in the dual system remains basically correct.37
by the association at the national level talks in 1995.  The employers’
association argues that, while public subsidy support of in-firm training is
undesirable in principle, it is better to support one in-firm place that would not
otherwise have been created than to create an out-of-firm place, in which the
apprentice is not in a real firm and the skills learned are less likely to be those
demanded by companies in the private economy (Culpepper 1996).
In making their own decisions about subsidies to support apprenticeship
places, the governments of the new Länder—regardless of their political
complexion—have not felt constrained by the principle of no aid for in-firm
training.  All five of the new Land governments and that of Berlin have
developed subsidy programs for in-firm training places, based on various
criteria such as creating “supplementary” places (those places offered by firms,
even though they foresee no need for the future labor) or creating places for
especially disfavored groups (e.g., women in technical professions).  In 1994,
roughly 45,000 in-firm places were supported by some of this public money;
that is, almost half the new in-firm places in the new federal states in 1994 were
publicly subsidized (BMBW 1995: 6).  The dual system is certainly not yet
working in eastern Germany exactly like it used to in the west.
As we saw in section 4, however, pouring all that money into in-firm training
has not led to good results everywhere:  many firms continue not to train at all
or at levels below those characteristic of the west.  From the sample of firms in
this paper, only one firm in Saxony-Anhalt was training in the target range on
western standards, and that firm received no training aid from the state
government.  Of the five firms training in the target range in Saxony, three had
received public subsidies to do so.  Also, both of the firms in Leipzig which
began training this year—at rates which will bring them into the target range (if
generalized over three and a half years)—received aid from the Saxon state
government to do so.  Including these firms in our calculations, then, the state
subsidizes apprenticeship training in five of the seven IHK firms in Saxony that
train at western German levels.
The difference in outcomes has nothing to do with the total number of
apprenticeship places supported by subsidies in the two states.  In 1995-1996,
the government of Saxony-Anhalt subsidized the creation of more
apprenticeship places per capita than did the Saxon government (BMBW 1996:
195).  We may well ask why the Saxon government is so much better than the
government of Saxony-Anhalt at using state subsidies to incite its firms to train.
The answer lies in the different design of policy in the two states.  Both
states offer the standard palette of programs for supporting “supplementary” in-
firm training places, or those targeted at specific groups.  In Saxony, however,
the  Land government in 1995 introduced a program for sponsoring the
cooperation of small and medium size firms with larger firms in a so-called38
Ausbildungsverbund, if the former lack the “organizational and technical
prerequisites” necessary to hire an apprentice (SSWA 1995).  Companies
training in technical professions can receive support for up to 52 weeks of the
three and a half year training course, with the bulk of the support coming in the
first year; given a maximum possible support of 225 DM per week per
apprentice, a firm can, over the 3.5 year course of a single apprenticeship,
receive up to 12,150 DM.  The definition of small and medium size firms is also
quite expansive:  firms with up to 500 employees are eligible to receive the
aid
28.
The existence of this new program in Saxony does much to explain the fact
(see Table 7) that in both Plauen and Leipzig a high proportion of training firms
are training in partnership.  In Saxony-Anhalt, there is no comparable program.
In fact, the personnel manager of one of the larger firms in the Sangerhausen
district attempted in 1994 to establish a Verbund with smaller firms in the area.
Between fifteen and twenty smaller firms expressed their willingness to
participate, and this group secured the backing of local unions, the works
council of the larger firm, the IHK, and the Landrat.  However, when this
coalition submitted its proposal to the Land government, it was rejected.  Firms
in this case evinced quite a considerable cooperative capacity, but without the
financial participation of the state government, the project was a non-starter.
In designing aid for training, Saxony is meeting the needs of its industrial
firms more effectively than Saxony-Anhalt.  Two variables are especially
important for understanding why Saxon policy is so well-attuned to the
demands of Saxon companies:  the organization of employers and the
presence of a sympathetic government
29.  Both the IHKs and the state
employers’ association, which is also the state affiliate of Gesamtmetall, agreed
on the desirability of adopting support for Ausbildungsverbünde at the state
level.  The CDU government of Saxony, under Kurt Biedenkopf, has shown
itself to be extremely solicitous of employers’ views in crafting new policies to
attenuate the problems of apprenticeship training in eastern Germany.
Moreover, with the support of the Land level affiliate of the DGB, the
Ausbildungsverbund subsidy program has been relatively uncontroversial in
Saxony.
Despite the success of employers in the Saxon case, the level of subsidies
of eastern German training may well engender fissures in the employers’ camp
as to who is bearing the load of training.  Larger eastern German firms
(generally, those with more than 250 employees) complain that the structure of
these subsidy programs unfairly favors smaller firms, especially given the
                                                          
28 Larger firms can serve as the training center for the partnership, but they are only reimbursed
for the administrative and organizational costs of serving as the training clearinghouse.
29 I develop these themes at much greater length in Culpepper 1996, on which the above
paragraph draws.39
frequent lack of experience of small firms in training apprentices (Schober
1994: 8).  And it is precisely these large firms which, in the new federal states,
foresee a significant further curtailment of their training capacity in the future
(BMBW 1996: 41; Degen and Walden 1995: 74).  These are the firms most
subject to the incentives—financial connections and information flows through
western German owners—and the constraints—works councils with greater
muscle than those in smaller firms in the east, attachment to the negotiated
wage bargain—which characterize firms in western Germany.  Unlikely to get
access to public funding of training through state governments in eastern
Germany, these firms have no inherent interest in continuing the subsidy
programs, which (indirectly) tax them.
All the medium size (Mittelstand2) companies in my sample that are training
in the target range are receiving very substantial subsidies to do so.  The
smaller IHK firms in the east have trouble training at all.  Until now, the
perennial demands of the German unions for a mandatory training charge on all
firms has been brushed aside with great success by the employers.  And it is a
safe bet that the IHKs and the DIHT (the peak association of the IHKs)  will
continue resolutely to oppose its introduction, for two reasons.  First, the
median constituent of the IHKs is the small and medium size firm, and these
firms certainly do not want to be saddled with a further rigidity in their labor
costs.  Second, the role of the IHKs in “governing” training is perhaps their
single most important raison d’être.  The introduction of a mandatory training
charge, not controlled by the IHKs, would greatly dilute their authority as the
bodies responsible for training governance.  Firms are already complaining
about the productivity of their required membership dues to the IHKs; without
their role as the leading institution in training, the worth of the services provided
by the IHKs would seem even more questionable.
The employers’ associations, meanwhile, have their own problems of
declining or stagnating membership (cf. Silvia 1994, Ettl and Heikenroth 1995).
The large firms which continue to train at western levels, unsubsidized, in
eastern Germany, are not going to quit the employers’ association, given the
strike protection it provides them.  Lacking the exit option, they are likely to
exercise voice; and in the employers’ associations, it is always the largest firms
who have the most important voices.  At least from its eastern members, the
employers’ association will face increasing demands for the small and medium
size firms to “do their part” and begin training at higher levels.  As local
taxpayers, large firms are contributing to the state government largesse which
is going into the pockets of medium size training firms.  And if exhortation does
not work, the associations could find themselves facing demands from some of
their members to join the call for the Umlage (sharing of costs) in training, as40
one of the points on which their interests would not be weakened in accepting
union demands
30.
The financial subsidies for in-firm training in eastern Germany, at least as
currently conceived, exacerbate the organizational problems faced by
employers’ organizations, in that they introduce a new distributive conflict
among companies.  The Saxon example demonstrates that subsidies crafted in
consultation with employers will undoubtedly work better in achieving the
transitional aims of getting eastern firms to train at western levels. What is not
clear at this point is whether financial subsidies for training are going to
constitute a crucial, but temporary, measure, while the western German
institutions take root, or whether instead the presence of subsidies will
introduce new dynamics of inter-employer conflict and rent-seeking which could
subvert the principle of firm responsibility at the heart of the dual system.
                                                          
30 The umbrella union federation, the DGB, has been vocal in denouncing financial support for
training.  The DGB argues that if companies are not willing to pay the costs of training and
assume their responsibilities, then the training system should be moved directly into the public
sector.41
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